Cornell - Peru Project

Distribution of land among Vicosinos was uneven and when Cornell arrived in 1952 about 100 families had house sites but no other land for subsistence agriculture. These landless Vicosinos worked for those who had plots for a share of the produce. The hacienda system had been extended internally within the community itself further exacerbating the gap between the relatively well off and the very poor. Labor was the most valuable commodity on the hacienda and the patrones could sell Vicosinos' labor to the nearby linen textile mill, to the mines, to other haciendas, and to public works projects. None of this labor was remunerated.

"In 1957, at the time Cornell's lease in Vicos expired, the [Cornell-Peru] Project made a recommendation to the Peruvian Government [...] to expropriate the property [...] in favor of its indigenous inhabitants. [...] The Peruvian government acted upon the recommendation and issued a decree of expropriation." (Holmberg 1971b:58). "The expropriation resolution did not become effective. Quite the contrary, a long and sterile struggle began between the Vicosinos and the Public Benefit Society of Huaraz, owner of the manor. From 1956 to July, 1962, when the purchase finally was officially approved, the Vicosinos were aided and protected by a 'power umbrella' consisting of the Cornell Peru Project and the Peruvian Indian Institute [...]. Holmberg 1971b:49)". "Meanwhile the Vicosinos, now renting the manor directly by using their own earnings, were reluctant to develop Vicos because of the danger of their not being able to enjoy the fruits of such labor." (Holmberg 1971b:58).

They also hired the hacienda foreman, Enrique Luna, who had a reputation of being stern with the Indian population, as administrator of the agricultural projects. Thereby, Cornell became the new patron, but this was rationalized as a necessary step in modernizing the Vicos population. Slowly, the work requirement was removed as Vicosinos began to make decisions and to manage the hacienda themselves in 1956 (Doughty 2004).

The above document outlines the proposed development for Vicos, such as modernizing the clothing.

At the time of Cornell's entry into Vicos, only 23 men could speak Spanish and no one was literate (Lynch 1981:38). Health, nutrition and living conditions were miserable and self-esteem was low. Cornell's agents of change assumed that the transmission of Western technology and knowledge would integrate indigenous populations into national industrialized and commercial agricultural economies and thereby usher them into the 'modern' democratic age that would result in substantially improving their lives. This optimistic faith in development and modernization, common after World War II, did not foresee the many pitfalls that with hindsight, we are aware of today.

1 Barbara Lynch wrote an excellent evaluation of the “Vicos Experiment” in 1981 for AID using the Vicos archive in Olin library. I draw on that summary as well as the articles by Doughty (2002/2004), Stein (2003) and Mangin (1979). For a concise history of development efforts in Peru and comments about the Cornell-Vicos Project see Avila 2000.